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Post-Earthquake Failure of a Tailings Dam Due to
Liquefaction of the Pond Deposit
Kenji Ishihara
Department of Civil Engineering, University of Tokyo

ABSTRACT At the time of the Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai earthquake of January 15, 1978 in Japan, two darns
retaining tailings from Mochikoshi gold mine failed, leading to a release of a large volume of tailings. One of the darns, No.1 dike, collapsed almost simultaneously with the shaking of the main
shock, but another darn, No.2 dike, failed about 24 hours later at a time when there was no shaking.
The failure of the No.1 dike is known to have been triggered by the liquefaction which developed in
the tailings deposit in the impoundment pond. The cause of the failure in the No.2 dike has not,
however, been studied and left open to question. To provide a basis to answer this question, an
attempt was made to analyze outward movement of phreatic surface within the dike fills which is
motivated by an increase in pore water pressure due to liquefaction developing in the pond deposit
behind the retaining dike. It was shown that the phreatic surface could move up to a level near the
downstream surface by the time the failure of the dike took place. At each stage of the phreatic
surface movement slope stability analysis was performed using the conventional method and factors of
safety were calculated. Results of the analyses showed that the factor of safety drops approximately to unity at the stage when the phreatic surface reaches a location in proximity to the surface of
the slope. The period of time elapsed for the phreatic surface to reach the near-surface location
was also computed and shown to be nearly coincident with the time period between when the earthquake
occurred and when the failure actually took place in the No.2 dike.

INTRODUCTION

In view of the context as above, an attempt has
been made to develop a concept and procedure
enabling a mechanism of the delayed failure to
be clarified for the incident of the No.2 dike
at Mochikoshi. In the following pages, the
consequence of this study will be presented,
together with the general outline concerning
the 1978 earthquake, construction and operation
of the tailings disposal pond and results of
soil investigations. The general information
as above on the Mochikoshi tailings darn was
quoted from the report of the Investigation
Comrni ttee.

The tailings deposits in the impoundment ponds
are usually soft, loose and permanently saturated. Consequently they will tend to liquefy
at an early stage of major earthquakes, applying an increased horizontal load on the darn
retaining the tailings. Therefore, the occurrence of liquefaction could be a potential hazard that can lead to catastrophic failure of
the tailings impoundment darns. In fact, several cases of such darn incidents have been reported recently. Failures of the Barahona darn,
Chile, in 1928 (Aguero, 1929), El Coble darn,
Chile, in 1965 (Dobry and Alvarez, 1967) and
Mochikoshi darn, Japan in 1978 (Marcuson, 1979:
Ohkusa and Anrna, 1980) are typical examples of
failures of the tailings darns.

IZU-OHSHIMA-KINKAI EARTHQUAKE OF 1978
On January 14, 1978, a destructive earthquake
of Magnitude 7.0 shock the southeastern area of
Izu Peninsula which is located about 120 km
southwest of Tokyo, Japan (Fig. 1). The epi~
center of the main shock was located about 15 km
off the east coast of the peninsula, midway
between the peninsula and Ohshima Island as
shown in Fig. 2. The main shock was followed
by a series of aftershocks lasting for a week
with their epicenters moving gradually in a
westerly direction. The epicenters of the
aftershocks with a magnitude greater than M =
4.0 are also indicated in Fig. 2 by solid
circles. The largest aftershock was a pair of
shakings that took place at 7:30 a.m. and 7:36
a.m. on January 15, 1978 with their epicenters
located approximately in the middle of the IzuPeninsula in proximity to the Mochikoshi tailings darn site. Most of the shocks are presumed
to have had a focal depth of about 10 krn. The

All of these documented cases describe failures
of darns as having taken place almost simultaneously with or immediately after the shaking of
earthquakes. However, in the case of the incident at Mochikoshi tailings darns in 1978, Japan,
while the No.1 darn failed at the same time as
the main shaking, the breach of the No.2 dike
took place about one day after the main shock
of the earthquake at a quiet time without any
tremor. According to the report (1979) issued
by the Investigation Committee, the cause of
the breach at No.1 dike is attributed to the
occurrence of liquefaction in the disposal pond
and consequent loss of stability of the retaining darn. With respect to the failure of No.2
dike, no clear-cut interpretation is presented
for mechanism triggering the breach, probably
because the problem was for from conclusive.
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Contours of equal shaking intensity in
terms of estimated maximum horizontal
accelerations

Location of Izu Peninsula
CONSTRUCTION OF TAILINGS CONTAINMENT DIKES
The Hozukizawa disposal pond at Mochikoshi was
constructed on a bowl-shaped depression on top
of a mountain shown in Fig. 4 by sealing off
the periphery by three dikes. The plan vie~ of
the pond is shown in Fig. 5. The site cons1sts
of weathered deposit of cobble-containing tuffs
which were transported by a series of eruptions
of volcanos in the mountian ridge in its neighborhood. At the initial stage of construction
strongly weathered surface portion was stripped
off and less weathered tuff formation was exposed in a saw-teeth shape to provide rough surface for the foundation of the overlying starter dam. The starter dam was constructed in
1964 by placing local soils of volcanic origi~
by means of bulldozers. During the construct1on
operation the passages of bulldozers helped compact the soils to a desired density. In order
to provide drainage for water emerging from
nearby springs, a system of drainage consuit
was installed at the bottom of the starter dam.
However, because of a relatively high degree of
permeability provided by the original mountain
deposit, no drainage system was installed over
the bottom of the pond for draining excess
water resulting from consolidation of tailings
sludge.

So.gami Bay

10
.

Fig. 2.

I

2Qkm

-..J

Locations of the main shock and
aftershocks of Izu- Ohshima-Kinkai
earthquake

strong shaking motion produced by the earthquake was recorded at several stations, but all
of them were obtained outside the area of highest intensity shaking. A survey of the overturning of tombstones in many cemetries near
the epicentral region disclosed an approximate
picture of distribution of shaking intensity.
Fig. 3 shows contour lines of equal maximum
horizontal acceleration thus established (Ohashi
et. al, 1978). It may be seen that at Mochikoshi site the acceleration is estimated to be
approximately 250 gal on the ground surface.
A more detailed account on the earthquake and
damage feature is given in a previous paper by
Ishihara and Nagao (1983).

The mine milling operation to extract gold was
conducted in the processing plants beside the
Mochikoshi river (Fig. 4). The tailings produced there in slurry had been pumped through pipes
through a height of 600 m up to the dispopal
pond located on top of the mountain. The
pupmed-up slurry was delivered either to the
site of No.1 or No.2 dike and discharged towards
the pond from three pipes at each dike site.
The dike was successively raised by placing the
local volcanic soils at a rate of approximately
2 m per year by what is called upstream filling
method.
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Plan of the Hozukizawa disposal pond at Mochikoshi
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DAMAGE TO TAILINGS DAMS
1.

Failure of No.1 Dike

The failure of No.1 Dike was triggered by the
main shock of the Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai earthquake.
The feature of the collapse is demonstrated in
the cross section shown in Fig. 6. The biggest

next biggest with a magnitude of 5.4 at 7:36
a.m. After these shocks around 8:30 a.m., a
surveillant found five to six cracks developing
on the downslope face in parallel with the axis
of the dike.
These cracks were reportedly 1 to
3 meter long with openings about 5 mm wide. At
a later time around 9:30 p.m., another surveillant discovered a longitudinal crack, opening
5 m long and 5 em wide in the middle of the

Before failure

r----------···--I

I

r-

After failurU
----------

Fig. 6.

Cross-section through embankment of No.1 dike

dike 28 m high and 73 m wide at crest level
collapsed almost at the same time as the major
shaking of the earthquake. A guardian of the
pond who happened to be stationed at a house on
the left bank came out immediately upon perceiving an unusually ~igh shaking and watched the
terrific moment of disaster. According to his
account, within a matter of 10 seconds after
the main shock, the frontal wall of the dike
swelled and the breach took place at the upper
part in proximity to the left abutment, followed by a huge mass of slime rushing down the
valley with a dreadful wham whereby mowing
trees and scoring the bottom of the valley.
When the rushing slime came to the junction
with the Mochikoshi river, the slime hit the
flank of masonry walls, jumping up about 10 m
high on the lift bank of the river channel and
deposited to about 30 em thickness over the
road beside the channel. The slime flowed down
the Mochikoshi river sedimenting in the river
bed to a thickness of 1.0 to 1.9 m through the
distance of about 800 m from the point of confluence.
The flowing slime further travelled
into the Kano river and contaminated the river
through a distance of about 10 km down to the
mouth of the river.

downstream slope of the No.2 dike.
At about 1:00 p.m. on that day, a caretaker
standing on the opposite side of the No.2 dike
happened to notice a gradual sinking of the
central part of the dam. While running to the
dam site, he watched the dam failing suddenly
through a crest width of about 20 m leading to
a release of the impounded tailings sludge.
Later on the breach was enlarged to a crest
length of 65 m, generating a number of cracks
over the sloughing surface. A total volume of
3,000 m3 consisting of 2,000 rna of tailings
slime and 1,000 rna of dike material flowed down
the valley to a distance of about 240 m.
The
feature of the collapse is shown in Fig. 7.
The portion of the five-step dike additions
above the starter dam was taken away, as shown
in Fig. 7.
The plan view of this slide is
shown in Fig. 5.

SITE INVESTIGATIONS AND SOIL TESTS
After the failure of the dikes, in-situ investigation on soils and ground water conditions was
carried out, together with appropriate laboratory tests on tailings and on soil samples
recovered from the inflicted site.

The top portion of the No.1 dike failed totally
through a height of 14 m from the top level of
impoundment down to the elevation of the starter dam, as illustrated in Fig. 6. A total
volume of 80,000 rna was released as a result
of the dike failure, of which 60,000 m 3 was
the tailings and 20,000 m3 the dike-forming
volcanic ashes.
2.

1.

Borings were made at 12 locations in and near
the disposal pond, as indicated in Fig. 5. The
boring logs in the vicinity of the No.1 dike
are shown in Figs. 8 through 10 and those conducted near the No.2 dike are demonstrated in
Figs. 11 through 12. The log of Boring No.2
drilled from the exposed failure surface reveals
the presence of a thick layer of fill composed
of weathered volcanic ashes underlying the deposit of the tailings slime. This fill is the

Failure of No.2 Dike

As described in the foregoing, a series of
medium-sized earthquakes rocked the central
part of the Izu peninsula from early morning to
noon time on the day of January 15, 1978. The
biggest aftershocks occurred at 7:31 a.m. with
a magnitude 5.8, followed immediately by the
1132
First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering
Missouri University of Science and Technology
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu
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59706

Fig. 9.
main body of the starter darn.
It may been seen
in Fig. 8 that the fill had a blown count value
of 3 to 7 in the standard penetration test.
The
log of Boring 4 conducted in the interior part
of the pond indicates that there exists a thick
layer of tailings sludge down to a depth of 18 m
underlaid by an original deposit in the mountain.
The result of the standard penetration test
indicates blow count values on the order of 1 to
2 near the surface but somewhat larger values of
4 to 9 in the lower half portion of the sludge
deposit.
The progression of consolidation with
drainage towards the permeable bed soils may
have stiffen the slime deposit near the bottom
of the disposal pond. Near the surface which
coincides with the failure plane, the penetration rod sank by its self-weight to a depth of
2 rn without any hammer blow.
The presence of
the extremely soft layer must have acrued as
a result of liquefaction developed to this elevation during the quake.
The log of Boring No.
10 drilled in the center of the pond indicates a

Soil profile behind No.1 dike (From
report of the investigation committee)

complete soil profile from the pre-earthquake
surface level not stripped off by the failure.
The blow count value is equal to zero down to a
depth of 15 m, whereupon it increases to a value
between 3 and 6 near the bottom of the slime
deposit. Underneath the slime layer these
exists the original deposit of the mountain
consisting mainly of weathered volcanic ashes.
The fact that there is little resistance to
penetration down to the depth of 15 m does not
appear to have ever been so, but seems to have
been caused by the occurrence of liquefaction
due to the earthquake.
The log of Boring No.8 obtained from the failure
surface at No.2 dike is demonstrated in Fig. 11,
where it may be seen that the tailings slime
deposit was probably remolded down to an elevation of 614.50 mas a result of liquefaction
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portion of the slime deposit.
The standard
penetration test results show a blow count value
of 4 to 5 for the bulldozer-rolled fill of the
starter dam.
Still another log of Boring 7
obtained from the top of an intact portion of
the No.2 dike indicates, as shown in Fig. 13,
that the bulldozer-rolled fills constructed by
the stepwise top additions had a blow count
value of approximately 5.

20

Fig. 11.

Soil profile at No.2 dike (From report
of the investigation committee)

during the earthquake. The layers of deposit
underlying the tailings slime are those of original mountain deposits at this site, as can be
seen from the location of this boring site shown
in Fig. 5. The soil profile data at Boring No.
5 shown in Fig. 12 was obtained from the top of
the starter dam and accordingly it misses the

Reviews of the boring logs as above indicate
generally that the slime deposit near the bottom
of the pond had been consolidated having a blow
count value of 3 to 7, whereas the slime near
the failure surface was soft having almost zero
1134
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blow count value probably because of the remolding due to liquefaction. The containment dikes
constructed by additions of several steps of
bulldozer-rolled fills had a blow count value of
approximately 5 and a similar degree of penetration resistance was observed for the portion of
the starter dam.
2.

Phreatic Level and Pearmeability Studies.

Observation of water level in piezometer pipes
had been underway in the No.1 dike for surveillance purposes prior to the earthquake.
The
water level along the slope was relatively stationary and a set of surveillance results made
latest to the time of the earthquake provided
levels of phreatic surface at several locations
on the downstream slope which were consistently
about 3 m below the slope surface. A straight
line parallel to the slope surface was thus
regarded as representing the phreatic line existing in the No.1 dam at the time of the earthquake. For the No.2 dike there is no surveillance data identifying an exact location of the
phreatic surface. However, in view of almost
similar conditions in every respect, i t may well
be conceived that the phreatic surface in No.2
dike was also about 3 m below the slope surface.

Sand volcano

1Sondy

UilL

Section A-A
Fig. 14.

Permeability studies were also conducted both
in-situ and in the laboratory. The permeability
coefficient obtained from the in-situ grouting
method indicated a value on the order of 10-~
em/sec for the bulldozer-rolled dike material
and 10- 3 em/sec for the original bed rock composed of weathered tuffs. The permeability
coefficient of the tailings deposit was estimated to be approximately 7 x 10-~ em/sec in the
horizontal direction , but because of a highly
stratified nature of the sediment, the permeability in the vertical direction is supposed to
have been as small as one thousandth to one
hundredth.
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Tailings Materials

a.
Over the surface of the disposal pond on the
west side of the No.2 dike, a number of sand
volcanos were observed following the earthquake.
One of the biggest volcanos about 2 m in diameter of sand spread was carefully excavated to a
depth of about SO em. The cross-section through
the sand volcano thus obtained is shown in Fiq.
14, where i t can be seen that sand-containing
silt (sandy silt) and fine-grained material
(silt) are deposited, one on top of the other, in
thin layers 3 to 7 em in thickness. Two batches
of samples were recovered seperately each from
the portion of coarse-grained and fine-grained
layers.
The grain size distribution curves for
each portion are shown in Fig. 15. Also shown
in Fig. 15 are two grain size distribution
curves for the blended samples obtained by a
shovel in block.
It is to be noted that there
is an upper limit in qrain size which is 0.3 mm.
This is the maximum grain size specified in the
grinding process of the ore. Fig. 15 also shows
that the grain size distribution curves for two
blended samples lie within the range bounded by
those of the silty sand and silt. Void ratio of
the tailings was 0.98 and 1.00, and the specific
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Cross section of a sand volcano formed
on the surface of the disposal pond
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gravity was 2.72 and 2.74, respectively, for the
sandy silt and silt portion. Plasticity index
was 10 for the silt but the sandy silt was
identified as non-plastic. The index properties
of the tailings are summarized Table 1.
Several series of cyclic as well as static
strength tests were conducted on both disturbed
and undisturbed samples of the tailings sludge
by using the triaxial test apparatus. These
triaxial tests were run under consolodatedundrained conditions with pore water pressure
measurements.
Results of cyclic tests on disturbed specimens are described in a previous
publication (Ishihara et al, 1980). Undisturbed
samples of the tailings were secured by means of

Table 1.

Physical properties of tailings

Notations

Sandy silt

Silt

Specific Gravity

Gs

2-72

2-74

Liquid Limit

Wt. ("!.)

27

31

Plastic Limit

Wp ("!.)

Non-plastic

21

Plasticity Index

PI

Non-plastic

10

36

37

Items

In-situ
water contant
In-situ
void ratio
In-situ consolidation coefficient
In-situ volume
compressibility

w ("!.)
e

c.cc'"%,;nl
mvccm}kg)

0-98

---

1-00
0-1-0-8
load (0-0.6 k~)
S.5-22X10·Z
load(Q-0.6k9/crrf)

between the cyclic stress ratio, crd~/2(cro'l
versus the number of cycles required to produce
5 % double-amplitude axial strain in the test
specimen, where crdi denotes the amplitude of
cyclic axial stress and cr 0 ' is the initial confining pressure. Fig. 16 shows that the cyclic
stress ratio causing 5 % double-amplitude axial
strain in 20 cycles is on the order of 0.2. The
results of the tests on other samples from
different sampling sites and from different
depths showed more or less similar values of
cyclic strength to those shown in Fig. 16.
Scrutiny of all the test results showed that
the cyclic strength of the Mochikoshi tailings
may as well be represented by an empirical
formula which is promulgated in the Japanese
Design Code for tailings dams (Ishihara et al,
1981). According to the code, the cyclic
stress ratio causing 5 % double-amplitude
strain in 20 cycles of load application, R~, is
expressed as,
0.50
0. 085 log1 o ( - - )
Ds o

thin-wall tubes. The samples encased in the
tubes were once frozen to minimize the disturbance during transportation. The samples were
thawed in the laboratory and tested with an
appropriate back pressure to ensure full saturation of the specimen. Results of the static
triaxial shear tests indicated zero cohesion
component (C' = 0) and an angle of internal
friction,¢', varying between 30° and 39°, in
terms of the effective stress representation.
The angle of internal friction for the Mochikoshi tailings material was shown to be expressed
approximately by
tan¢'

0. 7

••• (2)

;.1here N is the blow count value in the standard
penetration test, and crv' is the effective overburden pressure in terms of kg/cm 2 •
Dike Materials
The dikes were constructed of a mixture of the
weathered tuffs and volcanic ashes covering
widespread area of the mountains in the vicinity.
The material is a potpourri of gravel, sand
and silt, as visualized from the wide range of
the grain size distribution curve shown in Fig.
17. Both index property and strength tests were

••••••• (1)

e

where e denotes the void ratio. One of the
results of the cyclic triaxial shear tests is
shown in Fig. 16 in terms of a relationship

~
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Cyclic stress ratio versus number of
cycles for undisturbed tailings
samples from the pond (From report of
the investigation committee)

performed on undisturbed samples secured in
chunk near the surface and also on samples recovered in thin-walled tubes from bored holes.
Wet unit weight, y, of the soil ranged between
14 and 19 kN/m 3 , natural water content, w, was
30 to 60 % and void ratio was 1.1 to 2.6.
The
permeability coefficient of the soil was shown
to be approximately on the order of l0- 4 cm/sec.
With respect to the strength, the consolidatedundrained triaxial shear tests on undisturbed
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samples trimmed from blocks indicated a cohesion of about C 1 = 25 kN/m 2 and an average
angle of interna.l friction of cp' = 35 °. For
the dike material, the cyclic triaxial test was
not performed.

STABILITY ANALYSES DURING THE EARTHQUAKE
i

1.

Fig. 18.

Analysis of Liquefaction

Following the earthquake a number of sand
volcanos were observed on the intact part of
the pond surface which was not disrupted by the
flow slide. Also, in view of the surprisingly
huge volume of the tailings involved in the
flow slide, it was suspected that occurrence of
liquefaction might have been responsible for
touching off a slide movement of such huge
quantity of soil.
In view of this, the Investigation Committee made a detailed analysis on
the likelihood of liquefaction occurring in
the tailings deposit on the basis of the laboratory test results. A detailed study was also
performed for assessing the input motion to be
incorporated in the response analyses at this
site. The maximum horizontal acceleration at
the base rock was estimated to have been on the
order of 90 gal during the shaking due to the
main shock. Seismic response analyses were
conducted for different soil profiles in the
pond by using the one-dimensional wave propagation theory. The results of the analyses indicated that the maximum horizontal acceleration
at the surface level of the disposal pond might
have probably been in the range of 150 and 250
gal. The analysis of liquefaction was then
made by comparing the seismically induced shear
stress to the magnitude of shear stress required to cause failure in the corresponding loading conditions. The results of such analyses
indicated that the liquefaction could indeed
occur and it could extend down to a depth of
approximately 7 m from the surface of the disposal pond.
2.

Division into sliced elements for the
stability analysis

gation Committee (1979) for a cross section of
the dike having soil properties shown in Fig.
19. The result of the stability analysis showed that for the static condition prior to the
earthquake, the factor of safely was 2.32 for
No.1 dike.
In the seismic loading condition,
two cases were considered. In the first case,
no excess pore water pressure was allowed for
in the analysis and the magnitude of seismic
coefficient necessary to bring the computed
factor of safely to unity was shown to be as
large as 0.3.
Then, in the second case some
appropriately assessed value of excess pore
water pressure due to the seismic shaking was
taken into account in the stability computation
by Eq. (3) .
It was found that the seismic coefficient of 0.17 was large enough to bring down
the factor of safety to unity from the initial
value of 2.32.

Pseudo-Static Stability Analyses

By incorporating different values of seismic
coefficient varying between 0.15 and 0.25,
slope stability analyses were made for a circular slip surface representing the actual sliding planes shown in Figs. 6 and 7.
The factor
of safely against sliding was calculated using
the following formula,
- U·9,)tan¢'+ C'

F

·£)

Fig. 19.

••• [3)

Z[Wsina + kHWcosa)

Analysis for No.2 dike
The stability analysis for the static loading
prior to the earthquake was made by the Investigation Committee (1979) for a cross section of
the dike having soil properties shown in Fig.
20. The result of analysis indicated a factor
of safety of 2.75. In the case of seismic loading conditions, the seismic coefficient value as
much as 0.4 was shown to be needed to bring the
computed factor of safety to unity, if no excess
pore water pressure is taken into accout. When
the excess pore water pressure is allowed for in
the stability computation, the value of the
seismic coefficient to bring the safety factor

were w denotes the weight of saturated soil in
each sliced element, u is the excess pore water
pressure, kH is the seismic coefficient, a is
the angle of inclination of slip plane at the
bottom of each slice and £ denotes the length
of the slip plane at the bottom of each element.
The notations are illustrated in Fig. 18.
Analysis for No.1 dike
The stability analysis was made by the Investi-
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Cross section of No.1 dike with soil
properties used in the stability
analysis

!'

.detail in the following sections.
1.

Fig. 20.

Cross section of No.2 dike with soil
properties used in the stability
analysis

down to unity was 0.23.
As described above, the computed factor of
safety for No.1 dike becomes equal to unity, if
a seismic coefficient of 0.17 is incorporated
into the analysis with a prope.r assessment of
excess pore water pressures caused by the earthquake shaking. This magnitude of seismi~ c?efficient was considered reasonable well w~th~n
the range of 0.15 and 0.25 predicted from the
seismic response analysis. It was then sought
what the factor of safety would be for the
stability of No.2 dike under the identical conditions in which the failure of No.1 dike did
occur.
Using the seismic coefficient of 0.17
and incorporating the effects of similarly
assessed excess pore water pressures, the factor
of safety was calculated to be about 1.5 for
No.2 dike. The Investigation Committee then
concluded that the No.2 dike had been potentially more stable than the embankment of No.1 darn
approximately by a factor of 1.5.

POST-EARTHQUAKE STABILITY ANALYSIS
As mentioned in the foregoing, the No.1 dike of
the Mochikoshi tailings impoundment pond failed
almost at the same time of the major shaking of
the main shock and a reasonable interpretation
was accorded to the cause of the failure on the
basis of the pseudo-static method of stability
analysis by incorporating a seismic coefficient
and effects of excess pore water pressures generated by the earthquake.
On the other hand, the No.2 dike of the disposal
pond survived the damage during the main shock
and a series of subsequent shocks as well.
However, this dike eventually failed about 24
hours after the main shock while there was no
shaking. The cause or mechanism of the failure
of this dike was not discussed exhaustively in
the report of the Investigation Committee and
has been left open to question since then.
It
is to offer an answer to this question that the
present study was undertaken. The basic concepts and procedures for examining the stability
of this dike consist in clarifying time-changes
in seepage conditions caused by the movement of
the phreatic surface within the dike. This
aspect of the problem together with procedures
for eveluating its effects will be discussed in

It is highly likely that the build-up of pore
water pressure due to liquefaction in the deposit behind the dike created an unbalanced
state of seepage conditions within the deposi~
underlying the dike. A newly created hydraul~c
gradient appears to have then raised the ~leva
tion of the phreatic surface w~htin ~he.d7ke,
leading eventually to a precar~ous cond~t~on of
the embankment even in the static state after a
series of earthquake shakings. It would, ~h~r~
fore, be necessary first to explore a poss~b~l~
ty of analytical treatment in which time-changes
of the phreatic surface can be assessed.
The layout of the present problem in illustrated
in Fig. 21. Let it be first assumed that liquefaction due to the main shock of the earthquake

Fig. 21.

Setting for analysis of phreatic
surface movement

developed to a depth of H and any change in
seepage conditions in the deposit below this
elevation can be disregarded. The dike constructed of cohesive materials is represented by
the section OEDB in Fig. 21 and a deposit of
tailings below the dike is represented by a
triangular section OBA. It will also be assumed
that the phreatic surface had been located,
prior to the earthquake, along the interface OB
between the main body of the dike and the underlying tailings deposit. If the ground water
level within the pond is assumed to coincide
approximately with the surface of the tailings
deposit, and if the tailings below the dike is
assumed to have completed consolidation, then
water pressure at depth, H, prior to the earthquake is YwH and its distribution is hydrostatic
as indicated by OAP in Fig. 21, where Yw is unit
weight of water. It may as well be assumed that
the pre-earthquake water pressure distribution
along a horizontal plane AB at depth, H, is represented by a triangle ABR.
As described in the foregoing section, liquefaction did develop during the shaking of the main
shock in the deposit of the disposal pond.
However, it is likely that the liquefaction
occurred only in the portion of the pond where
the tailings deposit is exposed on the surface.
The portion of the tailings deposit covered by
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A Method of Analysis for Movement of
Phreatic Surface

the dike might not have undergone liquefaction
because of a high confining stress exerted by
the overlying dike fills.
Therefore, i t will
be assumed that any pore water pressure change
in the deposit below the dike were not brought
about by the liquefaction of its own but caused
by a propagation of the excess pore water pressures from the liquefied deposit behind the
dike.
Upon development of liquefaction in the
pond, the hydrostatic pressure at depth, H,
rose by an amount, Y'H, as indicated by PQ
where Y' is unit submerged weight of the tailings material.
Therefore, the pressure distribution along the horizontal plane AB may well
be assumed to have increased by an amount represented by a triangle RBS in Fig. 21.
It may
as well be assumed that such a change in pore
water pressure distribution has taken place in
a relatively short period of time following the
onset of liquefaction.
The increase in pressure
as above then created a hydraulic gradient which
is directed towards the surface of the bank and
accordingly migration of water is expected to
have been motivated in the direction of ascending the phreatic surface within the dike.
The
configuration of the phreatic surface will be
assumed to be a straight line passing through
point 0 at all instances of time during the
ascent of the phreatic surface. To develop an
analysis for the phreatic surface movement let
i t be assumed that within a time interval, t,
from the onset of liquefaction the phreatic
surface has moved from the location OB up to OC,
which is represented by the coordinate, x, taken
leftwards from point B in Fig. 21. At this
instant of time, the hydraulic gradient of water
flow may be taken as

Solving this differential equation under an
initial condition x = 0, when t = 0, one ~btains

~

=

-1 +

J1

+ 2

~~ ~ ~~

••••• (5)

The relationship of Eq. (5) is numerically presented in Fig. 22, where the ratio, x/L, specifying the front of the moving phreatic surface
is plotted versus the time factor, kt/(SL}, for
different values of H/L. Considering a most
representative case encountered with tailings
deposits, the buoyant unit weight, Y', is assumed to be 9. 5 kN/m 3 •

y'H
Yw

L

+ x )

where L is the distance between points A and B
in Fig. 21.
If the location of the phreatic
surface is assumed to move through a small distance, ~x, in a small time interval, ~t, then
the amount of water migrating across the current
phreatic line OC is calculated on the basis of
Darcy law as follows.
y'H

H

K2

YH ( L +

.
X

Fig. 22.

2.

)

S ..!!_ ~X
2

where H~x/2 indicates an area of the triangle
OC'C in Fig. 21 and S is the storage capacity
coefficient.
Since the amount of inflow must
be equal to the quantity of stored water, one
obtains

dt

y'
H
k Yw L + X

Movement of Phreatic Surface in No.2 Dike

The analysis of liquefaction as described in
the preceding section indicated that the deposit
in the tailings pond had liquefied during the
main shock of the earthquake to a depth of approximately 7 m.
It is also known that the
phreatic surface through the No.2 dike prior to
the earthquake had probably been located at a
depth of 3 m from the downslope face of the dike.
Therefore, with reference to the geometrical configuration shown in Fig. 23, values of H and L
may be set as H = 7 m and L = 21 m, and therefore
H/L = 1/3. According to the laboratory tests,
permeability coefficient of the dike material was
shown to be on the order of k = lo-•cmjsec. With
respect to the storage coefficient, S, there is
no measured data either from in-situ or from any
laboratory test.
However, i t should be recalled
that the storage coefficient is defined as a
function of porosity, n, and saturation ratio,
Sr, as follows,

~t

where k is the permeability coefficient and H/2
is an equivalent cross sectional area across
which the ground water moves.
The water which
has migrated across the current phreatic surface
is stored in the pores of the soil existing in
partially saturated zone.
The quantity of water
that can be stored is given by

S dx

Travel distance of phreatic surface
with time

S

=

n ( 1 - Sr

••••••• ( 6)

••••••• [ 4)

The right-hand side of Eq. (6)
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is equal to the

volume of air void per total gross volume of
soil. Therefore, if a soil is brought to a
completely saturated state as a result of migration of water, the associated storage capacity can be correctly represented by the coefficient given by Eq. (6). However, if the soil

0

5

about 9:00 a.m. on that day. A chain of events
that occurred during this period of time is displayed in Fig. 24.
It can be seen that a pair
of greatest aftershocks with magnitude, 5.8 and
5.4 successively occurred at 7:31a.m. and 7:36
a.m., respectively, on January 15th, (Tsumura
et al, 1978). On the other hand, as mentioned
in the foregoing section, a surveillant discovered several strips of fissures running in
parallel to the axis of the dike after this
series of aftershocks. This fact would appear
to indicate that a larger number of invisible

Y1=15·7kN~m3, ¢>;=3s·.ci=2SkN/m2
Sliding surface

I

I

I

I

I

I

Failure of
dik•2

H=?.Om

Main shock

Tailings

M=S.B

~20__

\

6

Y2 =19·1 kN/m3, ¢>~ =35•, C1=25 kN/m2

Fig. 23.

Sliding surface and soil properties
used in the stability analysis

3

2

1

remains still partially saturated, the storage
capacity will be somewhat smaller than that
predicted by Eq. (6).
In spite of some uncertainty as above, Eq. (6) seems to give a value
of storage coefficient with a reasonable degree
of accuracy that can be used for all practical
purposes.
For the dike-forming material, the
laboratory tests showed that n = 0.6 and Sr =
80 %.
Therefore, the value of the storage
capacity is calculated through Eq. (6) as being
approximately S = 0.12.
The failure of No.2 dike took place around 1:00
p.m. on 15th of January, about 24 hours after
the main shock. Therefore, assuming the movement of the phreatic surface to have started
following the onset of liquefaction, the period
of elapsed time by the occurrence of the failure
may be taken as about 24 hours. Then, by introducing t = 24 hours, the time factor in Eq. (5)
is calculated as,
kt
SL

10-4 X 24 X 60 X 60
0.12

X

21

X

0.034

100

Read off from Fig. 22 a value of x/L corresponding to the time factor of 0.034, one obtains x/L
= 0.013 and, therefore, the travel distance of
the phreatic surface is estimated to be x =
0.013 x 21 = 0.27 m.

0

I
p.m.

Fig. 24.

I

I

o.ooa.m.

6.00

p.m.

6.00
a.m.

Jan.15

Jan.14

I

12.00
p.m.
Jan.15

Occurrence of aftershocks with magnitude greater than 4.0 following the
main shock of the Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai
earthquake

cracks were created within the fills as a result of the shakings due to the pair of the
greatest aftershocks. Therefore, there are
reasons to believe that the permeability of the
dike had been significantly enhanced. Although
there is no way for knowing a correct permeability characteristics, it may well be assumed
with a judgement that the gross permeability
coefficient had increased to a value on the
order of magnitude of k = 2 x l0- 2 cm/sec as a
result of crack development over the slope of
the No.2 dike.
It may as well be assumed that
the period of elapsed time between when the
permeability was significantly increased and
when the failure took place in No.2 dike is
approximately 5.5 hours
With the above reasonings in mind, the time
change of the phreatic surface in the No.2 dike
may be reevaluated as follows.
The time factor,
kt/SL, appearing in Eq. (5) can be reevaluated as,

The movement of the phreatic surface as computed
above is too short to produce any significant
change in a seepage condition influencing the
stability of the dike. Therefore, some factors
appear to be missing, and some other thoughts
may need to be explored.

kt
SL

2 X 10- 2 X 5.5 X 60 X 60
0.12

X

21

X

1. 57

100

With reference to the curve in Fig. 22, the
travel distance of the phreatic surface is computed as

It is to be recalled here that, in the case of
the Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai Earthquake, a series of
fairly large aftershocks took place near the dam
site beginning around 3:00 a.m. in the morning
of 15th of January, 1978 and continued until

X
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I

12.00

= 0.4l·L

0.41 X 21

8.6 m

The distance of travel as computed above seems
to give a reasonable order of magnitude for the
effects of changes in the phreatic surface to
be allowed for in evaluating the stability of
the slope in No.2 dike.
3.

plane ABC may well be represented by a rectangle RSCB.
In the computational scheme of stability, a sliding circle was determined from
the observed surface of failure in No.2 dike,
and the soil mass above this sliding plane was
divided into 6 slices as shown in Fig. 25. To
illustrate the graphical procedure for estimating the pore water pressure, consider a sliced
soil element labelled "4" in Fig. 25. Since
the pore water pressure at point I is represented by the length IT and that at the surface
point 0 is zero, the distribution of pore water
pressure along the line OI may be approximated
by a straight line OT.
Therefore, at point H
at the bottom center of the slice 4 in question,
the total pore water pressure can be determined
by drawing a vertical line through point H and
locating the point U at its intersection with
the line OT representing the distribution of
pore water pressure along the line OI. The
total pore water pressure at point H is therefore represented by the length HU. The pore
water Dressures thus determined for all other
sliced~soil elements, being indicated by upward
arrows in Fig. 25, were employed in the computational scheme of stability analysis using the
formula in Eq. (3) • Factors of safety were computed in this manner for several stages of
movement of the phreatic surface. The result
of these analyses is presented in Fig. 26. by

Time Changes in Factor of Safety in No.2
Dike

The simplified analysis for the movement of the
phreatic surface as described above indicated
that, owing to the development of cracks and
consequent drastic increase in permeability of
the fills, the phreatic surface must have moved
up to a level where the stability of the slope
was seriously endangered. Therefore, i t will
be of interest to investigate how the factor of
safety, indicative of the degree of stability,
changed with time depending upon the location
of the phreatic surface.
The factor of safety was computed by means of
the formula in Eq. (3) whereby disregarding the
pseudo-static seismic force terms. Exactly the
same soil profile and soil strength parameters
as shown in Fig. 23 were employed in the stability analyses.
The term allowing for the
excess pore water pressure was evaluated graphically as illustrated in Fig. 25. This figure

0

5

10m
-

F

~Before_!ique~lon

~

2·0

u..
Q

G

Jan.15,9:45a.m.

:t:.!!

.."

0

'-

1·0

~

{i

Jan.15,1:00 P:m
86m

s

!
0

Fig. 25.

0

Layout for the stability analysis

Trav~l

Fig. 26.

shows a state of the dike profile where the
front of phreatic surface has advanced to point
C halfway between the initial location, B, and
the point D at the toe of the slope surface.
It is assumed, as mentioned in the foregoing
section, that the pore water pressure at point
A had increased by an amount, y 'H , as a result
of liquefaction that developed in the pond
behind the dike.
Therefore, the excess pore
water pressure at point A is laid off as the
length RS on the diagram by an appropriate
scale. Since there exists a sufficient amount
of liquefied material behind the dike, and
hence a continuous supply of water from behind,
the magnitude of excess pore water pressure at
point A may be assumed to have remained unchanged for a reasonably long period of time. On
the basis of this assumption, the distribution
of excess pore water pressure on the horizontal

10
(m)

Change of factor safety caused by the
movement of phreatic surface

plotting the computed factor of safety against
the travel distance of the phreatic surface.
The corresponding period of elapsed time computed through Eq. (5) is also indicated in Fig.
26.
In the static condition prior to the earthquake, the factor of safety was computed as
being 2.75 as mentioned in the foregoing, but it
dropped drastically to 1.85 upon development of
liquefaction in the tailings deposit behind the
No.2 dike due to the shaking of the main shock
which occurred at 12:30 p.m. on January 14, 1978.
It is to be noted that at this stage the pore
water pressure increase due to the liquefaction
is assumed to have propagated into the portion
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5
distance, X , of the phreatic surface

of the tailings deposit underlying the dike
but not yet pushed up the initial level of the
phreatic surface prior to the e~rthquake. In
the computational scheme shown in Fig. 25, the
distribution of pore water pressure along the
horizontal plane GD was taken to be a triangle
of ASB for the stability analysis of this
stage. Since no singificantly strong aftershock had taken place until 7:30 a.m. in the
morning of the next day, the front of the
phreatic surface had not presumably advanced
to an extent producint any significant change
in the computed factor of safety. However,
when a couple of large aftershocks occurred
around 7:30a.m., several strips of visible
fissures developed over the surface of the
dike, leading to a sharp increase in the permeability of the dike fills. From then on,
the front of the phreatic surface had presumably moved at a faster rate whereby reducing gradually the factor of safety. The
decreasing feature of the computed factor of
safety during this stage is also shown in Fig.
26. At about 1:00 p.m., 5.5 hours after the
occurrence of the large aftershocks, the phreatic surface had probably moved through a distance of about 8.6 m approaching the toe of the
dike surface bringing the embankment to a very
precarious state. The computed factor of
safety at this stage was 0.98 as accordingly
indicated in Fig. 26, and, therefore, the
safety of the dike is considered to have been
seriously endangered.
It is indeed at this
stage that the failure actually took place in
the fills of the No.2 dike.

allowing for redistribution of excess pore water
pressures generated by the earthquake.
~he
.
factor of safety computed for the stage ~mmedl
ately after the main shock was 1.85 but following a series of aftershocks, the factor of
safety was conceived to have decreased gradually
due to a sharp increase in permeability of the
dike fills caused by the development of cracks
and fissures in the embankment. About 5.5 hours
after the occurrence of the aftershocks, the
computed factor of safety dropped to a value
close to unity, indicating that the bank was
brought to a very precarious state. The comp~t
ed result of analysis was thus shown to be co~n
cident with what actually happened in the embankment.

Although the reasonings as above can provide a
simple interpretation for the mechanism triggering the post-earthquake failure of the dike,
they are based on several unverified assumptions. Among the most critical but most difficult to evaluate by any means is the permeability coefficient of the dike-composing fills
containing numerous cracks and fissures.
The
assumption on the distribution of liquefaction
induced pore water pressure is also unproved
and could be too much of approximation.
Therefore, the reasonings as above may have to
be taken qualitatively rather than in the
quantitative sense.
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several hours from the time of major aftershocks to the dike failure.
For several key
instances of time with rising phreatic surface,
a series of static slope stability analyses was
made using the conventional method whereby

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The investigation of the Mochikoshi tailings dam
failure was conducted under the supervision of
the Ministry of International Trade and I~dustry
of the Japanese Government. Part of t~e ~nfor
mation concerning the failure of the d~kes_was
offered by the Hochikoshi mining Co. Deta~~ed .
data on the seismicity of the Izu-Ohshima-K~nkal
earthquake were offered by Dr. K. Tsumura of the
Meteorological Agency of the Japanese Government.
The author wishes to acknowledge the kindnesses
of the above person and organizations in providing the most useful information.

Aguero, G. (1929), "Formacion de Depositos de
Relaves en el Mineral del Teniente," Anales
del Institute de Ingenieros de Chile, No.5
pp.l64-187.
Dobry, R. and Alvarez, L. (1967), "Seismic
Failures of Chilean Tailings Dams," Proc.
ASCE, Vol.93, SM 6, pp.237-260.
Investigation Committee (1979) , Report on the
Incidents of Mochikoshi Tailings Disposal Dams.
Ishihara, K. and Nagao, A. (1983), "Analysis of
Landslides during the 1978 Izu-OhshimaKinkai Earthquake," Soils and Foundations,
Vol.23, No.1, pp.l9-37.
Ishihara, K., Toroncoso, J., Kawase, Y. and
Takahashi, Y. (1980). "Cyclic Strength
Characteristics of Tailings Materials,"
Soils and Foundations, Vol.20, No.4, pp.l27142.
Ishihara, K., Yasuda, s. and Yokota, K. (1981)
"Cyclic Strength of Undisturbed Mine Tailings," Proc. International Conference on
Recent Advances in Geotechnical Earthquake
Engineering and Soil Dynamics." St. Louis,
Vol.l, pp.53-58.
Marcuson, W. F., Ballard, R. F. and Ledbetter,
R. H. (1979), "Liquefaction Failure of Tailings Dams Resulting from the Near Izu Ohshima
Earthquake, 14 and 15 January, 1978," Proc.
6th Panamerican Conference on Soil Mechanics
and Foundation Engineering, Lima, Vol.2, pp.
69-80.

1142
First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering
Missouri University of Science and Technology
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu

Ohashi, A., Iwasaki, T. and Kawashima, K.
(1978), "Estimate of Shaking Intensity
during the January 1978 Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai
Earthquake Based on Overturning of Tombstones." Report the Public Works Research
Institute of Japan, No.l399 (in Japanese)
Okusa, S anC. Anrna, S. (1980), "Slope Failures
and Tailings Darn Damage in the 1978 IzuOhshima-Kinkai Earthquake," Engineering
Geology, Elsevier Scientific Publishing
Co. Vol.l6, pp.l95-224.
Tsumura, K., Karakarna, I., Ogino, I. and
Takahashi, M. (1978), "Seismic Activities
Before and After the Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai
Earthquake of 1978," Bulletin of the Earthquake Research Institute, University of
Tokyo, Vol.53, pp.675-706. (in Japanese)

1143
First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering
Missouri University of Science and Technology
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu

